Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of private placement Originality/value-This paper adds to the existing literature surrounding private placements and is the first paper, to the authors' knowledge, to examine the impact of Australian REITs.
and movement away from their core business as major reasons why the A-REIT sector suffered such large losses during the GFC. During and post the GFC, a majority of A-REITs reduced their debt levels via recapitalisation and balance sheet restructuring using equity raisings (Newell and Peng, 2009 ). The increased equity raising has seen the average debt levels fall to approximately 26 per cent since the GFC, compared to over 40 per cent at the end of 2007 (Potts, 2012) . Following the restructuring, A-REITs have moved back to their core business and this re-focusing has resulted in improved performance (Ratcliffe and Dimovski, 2013) [1] . Table I provides a list of the top 17 A-REITs via market capitalisation as at June 2013.
The A-REIT sector is a significant component of the global REIT market. Australia is ranked second behind the USA in terms of market capitalisation, making up over 9 per cent of the global REIT market and 49 per cent of the Asia Pacific REIT sector (EPRA, 2012) . The A-REIT sector is recognised as a world leader in securitised property, operating in an established regulatory environment providing investors with governance and liquidity (Higgins and Ng, 2009 ). Furthermore, Newell (2008) highlights the sector's importance to superannuation funds, with the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) estimating that the collective worth of Australia's superannuation funds is over $1.5 trillion as at March 2013.
Superannuation funds have over 10 per cent of their assets allocated to real estate, this includes approximately 2 per cent directly invested in A-REITs (APRA, 2012 (APRA, , 2013 . The importance of the A-REIT sector is expected to continue to grow as the retirement investment industry responds to the demands of an ageing population. Reddy (2013) examined the asset allocation of industry superannuation funds and found funds would improve their risk-adjusted returns by increasing their investment allocation in property assets to 21 per cent. In addition, a market report by Jones Lang LaSalle (2012) has forecasted real estate allocation by superannuation fund to increase to 25 per cent over the next decade. Dimovski (2008 Dimovski ( , 2009 ) further identify the importance of A-REIT IPOs and capital raisings along with dividend forecasts for both retail and institutional investors, while Newell and Peng (2008) highlight the importance of emerging property sectors both in Australia and the USA.
The institutional features of the A-REIT market provide a unique setting to test the undervaluation hypothesis. More specifically, A-REITs are required to distribute 100 per cent of net taxable income to shareholders to avoid paying income tax at the trust level (tax transparency). Thus limiting the ability to utilise retained earnings to finance new investments.
Furthermore, this high level of distribution and the reliance on the capital markets for funding investments (Marciukaityte et al., 2007) may reduce information asymmetries between AREITs and shareholders resulting in the market being able to price A-REITs more effectively (Ratcliffe et al., 2009) . Prior empirical investigations show a high reliance on the capital markets, for example, Ghosh et al. (1997) show that from 1992 to 1997, US REITs issued equity three times more frequently than debt and raised twice as much capital using equity as compared to debt. Masulis and Korwar (1986) argue that regulated structures have less adverse reaction to equity announcements than industrial firms. The structure forces the firms to issue equity frequently and as such, the market anticipates these offerings. Therefore, the authors suggest that equity issues by regulated firms have less information content.
Previous literature
Prior research on equity offerings by REITs has focused on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and results have shown, on average, support for the information signalling theory. For example, Ghosh et al. (1999) Dimovski and O'Neill (2012) also examined the returns to subscribers and existing shareholders on both the listing day and ten days post announcement. For the full sample subscribers received, on average, a 7.7 per cent return on the announcement day and 7.8 per cent on day ten. Existing shareholder returns were −0.8 and 0.1 per cent, respectively.
Comparison of pre and post-GFC showed subscribers earned, on average, a 1.6 per cent return pre-GFC and 14.5 per cent returns post-GFC over the ten-day period. Existing shareholders received returns of 0.1 per cent pre and 0.3 per cent post-GFC over the same time period.
These results highlight the impact that the GFC has had on the overall market and in particular the A-REIT sector. Namely, volatility nearly 3.5 times more, a substantial increase in funds raised privately and an increase in the discount offered of nearly 2.5 times than that of the earlier period. Furthermore, the study supports the findings of Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) who highlighted the limited funding opportunities due to very low liquidity in debt markets and falling asset values had a dramatic impact on the A-REIT sector.
Examination of the announcement period excess returns of US REITs following private placements by Marciukaityte et al. (2007) found existing shareholders receive significant and negative CARs of −0.82 per cent over the [−1,+1] event window during the study period of 1981 to 1999. This result is in contrast to the findings of Wruck (1989) , Hertzel and Smith (1993) and Wruck and Wu (2009) who all found positive and significant CARs around announcement in their examination of private placements by conventional firms. Furthermore, Marciukaityte et al. (2007) found long-term positive and significant buy-and-hold ARs over the two-to five-year period. Again this result is in contrast to prior studies of conventional firms (Hertzel et al., 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; Wruck and Wu, 2009 ). The authors concluded that REIT managers time their placements for when equity prices are high, but longterm ARs are associated with prior performance and REIT managers are able to utilise the funding from placements to generate wealth for their shareholders.
Method

Event study
This study employs an event study methodology based on that set out by Brown and Warner (1985) to measure abnormal shareholder returns to existing shareholders around the announcement period. To implement the event study methodology the market model method is employed which accounts for the risk associated with the market and mean returns. The market model was estimated for each company over a 100-day estimation period (t−120, t−20).
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to determine the parameter estimations. The following market model is employed:
where E(Ri,t) is the estimated return on security i on day t, αi represents the intercept term, βi the slope coefficient. Rm,t the measure of the observed return for the market index, in this case the S&P/ASX200[3], on day t; and ɛi,t the standard error term. Heggen and Gannon (2008) note that there is a potential bias in estimating the parameters of the market model when using daily returns for shares that trade infrequently, to avoid this bias we utilise the Scholes and Williams (1977) 
Regression analysis
A regression model was developed to examine the ARs calculated above for A-REITs involved in a private placement, with independent variables being selected on the basis of prior literature.
OLS regression was utilised to test the significance of the relationship between each A-REIT CARs over the three-day event window [−1,+1], the regression model is:
The independent variables are defined as follows:
DISC is the percentage discount of the subscription price in relation to the share price the day prior the announcement, calculated as the share price day −1, less the subscription price divided by day −1 share price. A positive value here means the investor in the placement has received the shares at a discount. Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that the more difficult it is to value a firm; investors in private placements will require larger discounts. Given this information content we would expect a negative relationship between ARs and the discount. Alternative way of interpreting the negative coefficient is the higher the discount offered on the placement the lower the CARs (i.e. move towards negative returns).
FRACTION is the fraction of shares placed as a percentage of the total outstanding shares on issue before the placement. The information hypothesis suggests the larger the fraction placed the greater the information signal, therefore we expect a negative relationship between fraction placed and the CARs. Furthermore, the average discount was greater in post-GFC placements, 12.1 per cent compared to 2.6 per cent. A negative relationship with the dependant variable is expected here.
NET GEARING is calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt less cash, divided by shareholders equity. Jensen (1986) argues that firms with higher gearing levels make better investment decisions due to lower levels of free-cash flow. However, Campbell et al. (2001) suggests that the institutional structure of REITs and the restrictions placed on REITs free-cash flow may mitigate Jensen's (1986) claim.
SIZE is the natural log of the A-REITs market capitalisation on the day prior the announcement. Hertzel and Smith (1993) argue that information asymmetries are likely to be greater for smaller firms, therefore a negative relationship is hypothesised for size and excess returns.
BVMV is the ratio of the A-REITs book value equity to market value equity at the last released financial report (both annual and semi-annual reports were used to find the book value equity). Low BVMV ratios reflect higher expected future returns due to perceived growth opportunities.
Given this we hypothesise that A-REITs with a low BVMV ratio to have lower information problems. We expect placement announcement excess returns to be negatively related to the BVMV ratio.
REASON is a dummy variable of 1 if the A-REIT identifies that the placement funds will be used for an acquisition of property or development of a property. The reason for the placement contains a large amount of information for the market, if the A-REIT is using the funds to support their core business (generation of rental income) we would expect the information signal to be positive and hence a positive impact on excess returns.
Data
Private placement announcements from January 2000 to December 2012 were collected from the Datanalysis database, using the search function for ASX announcements. For the placement to be included in the dataset the following screens were conducted: the firm must be classified as an A-REIT;
there must be an absence of large-scale confounding events occurring within ten days of the announcement; the firms share price data must be listed on Datanalysis for the period beginning 120 trading days prior the announcement and ending ten days post; and the A-REIT cannot have a concurrent equity issue, for example, a rights issue, on offer within the analysis and comparison period.
A total of 96 private placement announcements were identified that met the above criteria. Table II The average size of the A-REIT involved in our sample is almost $2 billion, however, the median is over $900 million, suggesting that larger A-REITs utilise private placements more often than smaller A-REITs. The average fraction of shares placed is 10.37 per cent, below the 15 per cent level that requires shareholder approval under ASX listing rules. Table III As discussed above, observations that involved a concurrent private placement and rights issue announcement are removed from the data set. The aim of this study is to examine the impacts on shareholder wealth around private placements only, thus inclusion of these observations would create noise in the data set. However, we feel that it should be noted that post-December 2007 there were 27 private placements made by A-REITs that were made concurrently with a rights issue, raising over $12 billion. The average discount offered in the raising was 12.38 per cent [6] . The impact on shareholders wealth is outside the scope of this study, but it is certainly an area that warrants further research.
Results
Event study results
Table IV displays the daily excess returns for the full data sample of private placements from January 2000 to December 2012, along with the cumulative average ARs. We find significant ARs on days ten and four prior the announcement, suggesting minimal, if any, information leakage about the placement to the market. The CARs reaches a high of +1.85 per cent on day −4. Days 0 and +1 following the announcement display significant negative ARs of −0.25 and −1.07 per cent, respectively. This result provides support for the information signalling hypothesis, in that the new information conveyed that managers believe the firm is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Our results are comparable to those presented for REIT SEOs, both Ghosh et al. (1999) and Ong et al. (2011) find that REITs experience negative and significant excess returns around a SEO announcement. We find strong support for the information hypothesis and suggest that A-REITs face greater information asymmetries than what has been previously suggested (Hartzell et al., 2006; Sah and Seagraves, 2012) . Feng et al. (2007) discusses in a regulated industry management has less discretion and therefore information asymmetry is less severe. Feng et al. (2007) note that some authors argue that illiquidity and heterogeneity of property assets make valuation difficult, while others posit that the value of a REIT is the aggregate value of its assets. This study is the first, to our knowledge, to explicitly examine A-REIT shareholders risk adjusted returns from private placements over a period that includes the GFC.
Results show that existing investors experience significant wealth reductions around private placement announcements.
Our findings are supported by Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) who provide evidence of a structural shift in the risk characteristics of A-REITs due to factors such as a greater reliance on non-passive income, higher debt levels and a greater exposure to international property.
Furthermore, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) note a dramatic shift in REIT management and thus a greater investment in managerial skills resulting in REITs being more vulnerable to information asymmetry problems.
Cross-section regression results
In regression analysis a number of the independent variables may exhibit high levels of correlation, this can have an impact on their explanatory power and hence the robustness of the results. Table VI The results show a negative relationship between excess returns and discount across both models, suggesting that the higher the discount offered on a placement the greater the information signalling impact. This result supports Hertzel and Smith (1993) hypothesis that the more difficult it is to value a firm the larger the discount investors will require. We also find a positive relationship with reason for the placement, suggesting that when A-REITs announce the placement funds will be used to fund their core business the information signal is positive. This outcome has not previously been identified in prior REIT research. However, the significance of the variable disappears in panel B.
Consistent with Hertzel and Smith (1993) , we find a strong negative relationship across both panels for BVMV ratio. This result suggests that A-REITs that are trading a premium to net tangible assets earn higher excess returns, supporting our hypothesis that A-REITs with low BVMV ratios have lower information problems. We note from the descriptive statistics table that the maximum value of the BVMV variable was 5.877, over five-times greater than the mean. To investigate if this observation was driving the significance, the model was run after winsorising the BVMV value [10] . Results showed that the coefficients and p-values remained stable, however, the significance of BVMV fell to the 5 per cent level. Finally, we find that net gearing is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in panel A and at the 10 per cent level in panel B. That is, higher geared A-REITs earn lower excess returns in a placement announcement. This result is in contrast to Marciukaityte et al. (2007) , who found no statistically significant relationship between leverage and ARs. Campbell et al. (2001) posit that highly geared REITs (with low historical growth rates) may find it challenging to decrease their gearing levels due to the pay out requirements of REITs.
To investigate the net gearing result further, we isolated any observation from our data set that noted the reason for the placement was to repay debt or restructuring of their balance sheet [11] . We found that the average excess return for these A-REITs was −3.246 per cent over the [−1,+1] period, they also had higher than average BVMV ratios (1.35 vs. sample average of 0.948) and higher gearing (104.11 per cent vs sample average of 57.94 per cent). These results suggest that the announcement of the placement has conveyed information to the market of possible financial distress. To investigate if the gearing result was being driven by the impact of the GFC and the recapitalisation that occurred in this period, we re-ran the regression model with only the observations up to December 2007. These results are presented in Table VIII, it can be seen that the gearing variable remains negative and significant at the 10 per cent level.
Therefore, providing robustness to our conclusion that the private placement announcement for repayment of debt levels/balance sheet restructuring may convey possible financial distress.
Conclusion
Using event study methodology we examine the wealth effect of A-REIT shareholders around the announcement of a private placement. Overall our results reject the undervaluation hypothesis suggested by Hertzel and Smith (1993) , we find support the information signalling theory as presented by Myers and Majluf (1984) . We find, in contrast to prior studies of conventional firm placements (e.g. Wruck and Wu, 2009 ), on average, private placements have a negative and significant impact on existing shareholder wealth. However, to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the implications for A-REIT investor's further research is warranted.
Analysis of the long-term post-placement impact on shareholder wealth may shed more light on the motivations for private placements by A-REITs. It may-be hypothesised that because private placements are quicker and less expensive for A-REITs, relative to other equity raising options, that the long-term benefits to investors may outweigh the short-term costs. We also find evidence to support Marciukaityte et al. (2007) that A-REIT managers attempt to time their placements with favourable market conditions. Our regression analysis shows that price reversal from the information content in the placement announcement is lower for A-REITs with low BVMV ratios. Placements by AREITs trading at a premium to NTA may signal that the firm is in a strong financial position and the announcement has a positive impact on shareholders wealth. Results also show that AREITs that utilise placement funds for core business activities has a positive impact of ARs for investors. In contrast, we find A-REITs with higher gearing levels have a negative effect on shareholder excess returns. This outcome may signal to the market possible financial distress when making a placement announcement. Finally, results suggest that A-REITs with higher information asymmetries offer higher price discounts.
As discussed above, we believe that more research in this area is warranted. This includes the examination of the long-term impacts on investors post the private placement, along with assessment of placements announced concurrently with rights issues. In addition, further research into the relationship between private placements by A-REITs, separated by management structure (internal vs external) and announcement ARs may also shed more light on the underlying hypotheses. 
Notes
